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A large amount of activity in the financial sector occurs in secondary financial markets, where securities
are traded among investors without capital flowing to firms.  The stock market is the archetypal example,
which in most developed economies captures a lot of attention and resources.  Is the stock market
just a side show or does it affect real economic activity?  In this article, we discuss the potential real
effects of financial markets that stem from the informational role of market prices.  We review the
theoretical literature and show that accounting for the feedback effect from market prices to the real
economy significantly changes our understanding of the price formation process, the informativeness
of the price, and speculators’ trading behavior.  We make two main points.  First, we argue that a new
definition of price efficiency is needed to account for the extent to which prices reflect information
useful for the efficiency of real decisions (rather than the extent to which they forecast future cash
flows).  Second, incorporating the feedback effect into models of financial markets can explain various
market phenomena that otherwise seem puzzling.  Finally, we review empirical evidence on the real
effects of secondary financial markets.
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I.  Introduction 
One of the most important topics in financial economics is whether financial markets have an effect on 
the real economy.  This question has become particularly relevant in the light of the recent financial crisis.  
An important line of research, exemplified by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), studies how adverse selection or moral hazard problems affect primary financial markets by 
limiting the ability of entrepreneurs and firms to raise external capital.  This in turn constrains real 
investment, and so frictions in primary financial markets end up reducing real economic activity.   
However, there is an important feature of real-world financial markets that is missing in this line of 
research, namely that a large fraction of activity occurs in secondary financial markets, in which 
securities are traded among investors, without any capital flowing to firms.  The archetypal example of a 
secondary market is the stock market, in which capital flows to a firm only when it issues shares, but most 
of the time, trading is conducted between investors and does not involve the firm at all.  In this sense, 
derivative markets are almost always secondary, and there is large amount of activity in secondary bond 
markets as well.  In most developed economies, substantial resources are devoted to secondary markets 
such as the stock market.  However, in the line of research mentioned above, the operation of secondary 
financial markets has either no or very little effect on the real economy.
1  
How can one explain the attention devoted to secondary financial markets?  Why do managers constantly 
track the performance of their firms’ stocks? Why does the press so frequently report the developments in 
the stock market? Can this be rationalized in a world where secondary market prices are passive (i.e., 
epiphenomenal), in that they merely reflect expectations about future cash flows and do not affect them, 
as in many economic models, including most of those used in the asset-pricing literature? Related, is it 
plausible that secondary-market prices are purely passive, and have no effect on real decisions, given that 
a vast empirical literature documents how much information prices contain about future cash flows? 
                                                            
1 The ex-post liquidity of secondary markets affects the prices firms obtain ex-ante in primary markets. 3 
 
In our view, treating secondary market prices as a side show is a mistake.  Instead, we will argue that one 
should take seriously the idea that secondary market prices have an effect on real economic activity.  
Since secondary financial markets do not lead to any direct transfer of resources to the firm, prices in 
these markets have real consequences only if they affect the actions of decision makers in the real side of 
the economy (henceforth, ‘real decision makers’).  We can think of three reasons for which this may 
occur.  We argue that all of them originate from the informational role of prices. 
First, real decision makers learn new information from secondary market prices, and use this information 
to guide their real decisions.  The idea is very natural, going back to Hayek (1945), who argued that prices 
are a useful source of information.  A financial market is a place where many speculators with different 
pieces of information meet to trade, attempting to profit from their information.  Prices aggregate these 
diverse pieces of information and ultimately reflect an accurate assessment of firm value.  Real decision 
makers (such as managers, capital providers, directors, customers, regulators, employees, etc.) will learn 
from this information and use it to guide their decisions, in turn affecting firm cash flows and values 
(Baumol (1965)).  Ultimately, the financial market has a real effect due to the transmission of 
information.   
Some readers may wonder if it is plausible that real decision makers learn from prices.  They are closer to 
the firm than market traders, and so one might expect them to have better information.  However, this 
logic is incomplete.  The assumption needed for financial markets to have a real effect via the 
transmission of information is not that real decision makers are less informed than traders, but only that 
they do not have perfect information about every decision-relevant factor, and so outsiders may possess 
some incremental information that is useful to them.  Thus, real decision makers may be the most 
informed agents in the economy about the firm, but there are still aspects about which they can learn from 
outsiders.  This is for two reasons.  First, while an individual speculator may be less informed than the 
manager, the market aggregates the information of many speculators who collectively may be more 
informed (Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980)).  Second, optimal real decisions depend not only on internal 4 
 
information to the firm (about which the manager may be more informed), but also on external 
information, such as the state of the economy, the position of competitors, the demand by consumers, etc. 
Consider, for example, a firm manager, who is arguably the individual most informed about the firm’s 
fundamentals.  The manager announces an acquisition bid for another firm.  This decision is often made 
after undertaking substantial internal analysis and seeking the external counsel of investment banks, to 
assess whether the value of the target to the acquirer exceeds the offer price.  As is well known, this 
assessment is based on assumptions with a high degree of uncertainty.  In particular, the desirability of the 
deal depends on many factors other than the acquirer’s fundamentals and about which the acquirer may be 
less than fully informed – such as the standalone value of the target, the likely synergies between the 
acquirer and the target, and the future prospects of the industry (which affects whether it is optimal for the 
acquirer to expand via acquisition).  Hence, it is entirely plausible that, among the many speculators who 
trade in the stock market, some have insights into the proposed deal that were missed by the manager and 
his advisors.  If participants trade on this information, their insights will be reflected in the price.  Hence, 
when a manager announces an acquisition and the market responds negatively, he may learn from this 
response and cancel the deal.  Empirical evidence on this channel was presented by Luo (2005).
2   
More generally, managers may learn from prices when making other decisions, such as investment, as 
shown by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2010).  Moreover, decision makers 
other than managers are further removed from the firm and also lack decision-relevant information.  Thus, 
they are even more likely to use the information contained in market prices to guide their actions, which 
affect the firm’s cash flows and values.  Credit-rating agencies are known to be influenced by stock 
prices, and their decisions have a large effect on the availability of credit to the firm.  Regulators, who 
take actions that affect firm cash flows (most prominently, in the case of banks), follow market prices 
very closely (e.g., Feldman and Schmidt (2003) and Burton and Seale (2005)), and recent proposals in the 
                                                            
2 As an analogy, assume that there exist stock prices on individual researchers, which reflect the views of the general 
profession.  If a researcher’s stock price fell upon starting a new project, many such researchers would choose to 
abandon the project.   5 
 
light of the crisis advocate increasing the reliance on market prices even further (e.g., Flannery (2009), 
McDonald (2010), and Hart and Zingales (2011)).  Similarly, employees and customers may base their 
decisions on whether to work for the firm or buy its products on information they glean from the market. 
Second, even if decision makers do not learn from market prices, they care about market prices because 
they are party to contracts that are contingent on market prices.  This is most relevant for firm managers, 
whose compensation is tied to the firm’s share price.  Then, the manager’s incentives to take real actions 
will depend on the extent to which they will be reflected in the stock price.  If the stock price is not 
closely tied to firm value but instead driven by noise, the manager has weak incentives to exert costly 
effort to improve the firm’s fundamental value.   
Importantly, even though this second channel does not involve active learning from the price, it is 
ultimately similar to the first channel, in that market prices end up having a real effect due to their 
informational role.  The reason that contracts are conditioned on prices to begin with is most likely due to 
their informational role.  Shareholders choose to solve agency problems with the firm’s manager by tying 
his compensation to the stock price, because they believe that the stock price contains information about 
firm value.  If prices were uninformative, shareholders would not tie managerial compensation to stock 
prices, and so managers would not care about stock prices.   
Third, another possibility, favored by proponents of behavioral finance, is that secondary-market prices 
have a real effect on economic activity because real decision makers irrationally follow the price and use 
it as an anchor.  While we do not deny that irrationality exists, the ultimate source of the effect is likely to 
be the informational role of prices.  Presumably, the reason that real decision makers look at the price, 
rather than other public signals, is that the price often contains information.  There may be over-reaction 
due to bounded rationality, but the informational content is key for some reliance on the price to arise.  
Note that even fully rational learning from the price can lead to inefficient decisions since price changes 6 
 
sometimes arise from non-fundamental shocks (such as price pressure caused by fire-sales), which real 
decision makers may misinterpret as arising from fundamental shocks.
3   
In this article, we survey models that feature a feedback effect from financial markets to the real economy 
due to the informational role of prices.  Unlike the traditional approach, where prices only reflect 
expected firm cash flows, in these models prices both affect and reflect firm cash flows.  George Soros, a 
prominent trader, has termed this feature "reflexivity," and summarized it as follows: “In certain 
circumstances, financial markets can affect the so-called fundamentals which they are supposed to 
reflect.”
4  In reviewing the theoretical literature, we show that accounting for the feedback effect from 
market prices to the real economy significantly changes our understanding of the price formation process, 
the informativeness of the price, and speculators’ trading behavior.   
We make two main points.  First, if one accepts the idea that secondary prices have an effect for 
informational reasons, it follows that the traditional definitions of price efficiency need to be augmented.  
In particular, while financial economists typically study whether prices forecast future cash flows, a 
potentially more important question to ask is whether prices accurately convey information about 
underlying economic state or choice variables that are important for real efficiency.  We show that the 
two notions often diverge in models with feedback effects.
5  In particular, market prices may convey less 
useful information to decision makers than traditional notions of market efficiency would suggest.  In 
addition, the extent to which prices reveal information about an underlying state variable depends 
critically on how decision makers will use this information.  When using the information in the price, 
decision makers might harm the informativeness of the price about the variable they wish to learn.   
Second, we discuss the implications of the informational feedback from financial markets to real activities 
for various topics of research in finance, and in particular show how it generates natural explanations of 
                                                            
3 In contrast, note that it is quite possible for fluctuations in primary financial prices to have an effect, even if these 
fluctuations come solely from irrationality on the part of investors: see the survey of Baker and Wurgler (2012). 
4 This quote is taken from a testimony given by George Soros before Congress in 1994. 
5 This point goes back to Hirshleifer (1971), Bresnahan, Milgrom, and Paul (1992), and Dow and Gorton (1997). 7 
 
phenomena – such as manipulative short selling, the asymmetric dissemination of bad news and good 
news, financial-market runs, information-based trading, and the presence of non-controlling blockholders 
– that otherwise seem puzzling.   
The remainder of the survey is organized as follows.  Section II describes models of learning by decision 
makers from market prices.  Section III describes models in which financial markets have real 
consequences due to their incentive effect.  Section IV discusses the implications of feedback from 
financial markets to real activity for various research topics in financial economics.  Section V reviews 
empirical evidence on the real effect of secondary financial markets.  Section VI concludes. 
II.  Learning by decision makers 
A central topic in financial economics is price efficiency, which is defined as the extent to which market 
prices are informative about the value of traded assets.  Financial economists often argue that price 
efficiency is desirable because market prices guide real decisions (such as investment).  Thus, informative 
prices enable superior decision-making: price efficiency promotes real efficiency.  For example, Fama 
and Miller (1972) note: “(an efficient market) has a very desirable feature.  In particular, at any point in 
time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource allocation; that is, firms can make 
production-investment decisions ..." (p 335).  This idea is quite natural: if prices are efficient and 
aggregate information from various sources, then decision makers in the real sector, who are likely to be 
only partially informed, will wish to learn from prices.  This idea goes back to Hayek (1945), who argued 
that prices are a useful source of information.  There is vast empirical literature documenting the 
informational content of prices.  Strikingly, market prices contain information even about events far-
removed from firm cash flows: Roll (1984) shows that futures markets improve weather-forecasting 
relative to traditional meteorological forecasts, while a large literature on prediction markets (see Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz (2004)) shows that markets provide the most efficient mechanism for predicting election 
outcomes.  As argued in the introduction, there are many types of decision makers who can potentially 8 
 
learn from prices: managers, regulators, capital providers, customers, employees, etc.  The assumption is 
not that these agents (in particular, managers) are less informed overall than speculators, but simply that 
speculators have some information that they do not have. 
However, theoretical research on financial markets traditionally treats the real side of the firm as 
exogenous.  A large literature, starting from the seminal papers by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig 
(1980), Admati (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985), analyzes models in which 
informed speculators trade on their information about firm value and studies the extent to which their 
information is incorporated into prices – i.e., whether prices are efficient.  Since firm value in these 
papers is typically exogenous to trading in the financial market, these models do not allow us to study 
how real efficiency is affected by price efficiency. 
An exception is the early literature on the desirability of insider trading.  Fishman and Hagerty (1992), 
Leland (1992), and Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley (1994) present models where different types of 
speculators – insiders and outsiders – trade on their information.  Limiting insider trading reduces price 
efficiency since information possessed by insiders is no longer impounded into prices.  On the other hand, 
it also reduces adverse selection and thus encourages outsiders to trade on their information, increasing 
price efficiency.  Hence, there is a tradeoff with respect to the effect of insider trading on price efficiency.  
In these models, real decision makers learn from the price, and so the implications of the effect of insider 
trading on price efficiency are automatically translated into implications on real efficiency. 
Similarly, Boot and Thakor (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) use the feedback effect to 
rationalize a firm’s choice to issue publicly-traded securities, rather than receiving private financing (e.g. 
from a bank).  In these models, public trading allows the firm to infer information from its stock price and 
use it to improve its real decisions.  Foucault and Gehrig (2008) extend this reasoning to explain the 9 
 
decision of a firm to cross-list its shares in two different markets: cross listing enables the firm to obtain 
more precise information from the stock market and improve the efficiency of its investment decisions.
6 
However, the link between price efficiency and real efficiency turns out to be more complicated, as was 
shown by Dow and Gorton (1997).  They study a model where managers learn from prices.  There are 
two equilibria.  In the first equilibrium, speculators produce information and trade on it, so that their 
information is incorporated in prices.  Managers then base investment decisions on prices.  In the other 
equilibrium, speculators do not produce information, and investments are not made (because their 
unconditional NPV is negative).  Technically, in this second equilibrium, prices are efficient since they 
fully reflect the fact that investment is not going to occur.  However, real efficiency is low, since the 
market does not provide information to guide real investment decisions.  Hence, price efficiency does not 
necessarily imply real efficiency. 
We can express the tension between price efficiency and real efficiency as follows.  The traditional focus 
of price efficiency is whether the price of a given security accurately predicts the future value of that 
security.  However, what matters for real efficiency is whether the price reveals information necessary for 
decision makers to take value-maximizing actions.  To distinguish the two notions, we will refer to the 
traditional notion - forecasting firm value - as forecasting price efficiency (FPE), while we term the extent 
to which prices reveal the information necessary for real efficiency as revelatory price efficiency (RPE).  
Dow and Gorton’s point is that it is quite possible for prices to be efficient in the forecasting sense, but 
not in the revelatory sense.  Revelatory price inefficiency immediately generates real inefficiency.  In 
                                                            
6 Other papers in the IPO literature have also used the assumption that stock-market participants have information 
about some aspects of the firm, which is not available to the firm’s managers.  See, for example, Rock (1986), 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and, Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002). 10 
 
contrast, forecasting price inefficiency affects real inefficiency only to the extent to which it is related to 
revelatory price inefficiency.
7 
The papers discussed above assume that decision makers lack information about state variables whose 
realization affects the value maximizing action.  Thus, in our definition of RPE, the information necessary 
for decision makers to take value-maximizing actions is information about these state variables.  Here, the 
distinction between RPE and FPE is reminiscent of Hirshleifer’s (1971) distinction between discovery 
and foreknowledge.  Discovery is important to uncover unknown information that can guide decision 
making, while foreknowledge is information about something that will be found out eventually and hence 
learning it early has no real implications.  Hirshleifer (1971) emphasizes that foreknowledge has no social 
value, while discovery is valuable, and argues that economic forces do not guarantee optimal information 
production.  Looking ahead to the next section, agency problems sometimes imply that the information 
necessary for real efficiency is instead information about the privately-observable actions of decision 
makers, and RPE relates to how accurately prices reveal these actions. 
The literature has identified at least three distinct ways by which RPE can fail in the case that state 
variables are unobserved by decision makers. 
First, assume there is perfect FPE, in that the security price perfectly aggregates all information currently 
available to market participants.  RPE commonly fails if expected firm value is non-monotonic in the 
state variable under the efficient decision.  To see this, observe that in this case, real efficiency and FPE 
imply the price is non-monotonic in the state variable.  But then a given price level can be associated with 
multiple different realizations of the state variable, and so RPE fails.  Such non-monotonicity can arise 
when the decision maker would like to take a corrective action that increases firm value when the state 
variable falls below a certain threshold.  For example, a board of directors may fire a badly-performing 
                                                            
7 Although RPE is necessary for real efficiency, it is not sufficient.  For example, firms may fall short of real 
efficiency simply because limited enforceability makes it impossible for shareholders to force a manager to take a 
particular action. 11 
 
manager, a private-equity fund may buy out an underperforming firm, or the government may provide 
assistance to an underperforming bank.  Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) analyze equilibrium 
outcomes in this case.  They show that in order to achieve the desirable outcome, the decision maker 
cannot fully rely on the information in the price, but must have some independent information of his own.  
In the context of monetary policy, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) observe that a similar problem 
constrains inflation targeting.  Sundaresan and Wang (2011) analyze the implications for the reliance on 
contingent capital with market triggers. 
Second, as in Dow and Gorton (1997), RPE can fail because a firm’s response to the information 
conveyed in prices may destroy speculators’ incentives to collect information in the first place.  In their 
model, this occurs when a firm interprets security prices as being random and hence uninformative, and 
so does not invest; but then foreseeing no investment, speculators do not find it profitable to collect 
information, ensuring that prices are indeed uninformative.  Bresnahan, Milgrom, and Paul (1992) present 
a milder version of this general argument: speculators may have stronger incentives to collect information 
about the future value of a firm’s assets-in-place than about cash flows that a firm’s current actions can 
affect.  Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2011) show how a similar mechanism can amplify bad economic 
shocks.  Bad shocks directly reduce firms’ investments, and this reduces speculators’ incentives to 
produce information.  As a result, firms’ investments decline further and so do their values (due to a 
decrease in the amount of available information), amplifying the original shock.  Faure-Grimaud (2002) 
and Lehar, Seppi, and Strobl (2008) study another effect: if a regulator acquires information from market 
prices, his incentives to acquire distinct information by himself are reduced, and so for some parameter 
values, the regulator’s total information (from all sources) is reduced. 
Third, even if speculators receive information costlessly, RPE may fail if prices do not efficiently 
aggregate speculators’ diverse pieces of information.  This possibility is analyzed by Bond and Goldstein 
(2011), who characterize circumstances under which the act of using prices as an input to economic 
decisions reduces RPE.  The decision maker’s reliance on market prices affects speculators’ incentives to 12 
 
trade on their information, in light of the traditional tradeoff they face between risk and return.  The extent 
of information aggregation also affects the traditional notion of FPE, but the two efficiency measures do 
not coincide.  Bond and Goldstein’s analysis highlights another dimension of RPE: even if a decision 
maker could increase RPE by committing to completely ignore security prices, he would prefer instead to 
put some weight on security prices.  The reason is that RPE is a relevant metric only if prices are actually 
used in making decisions.  Hence the appropriate welfare-measure must combine RPE with the extent 
prices are actually used in decisions. 
In summary, the papers above explain why market prices may convey less useful information to decision 
makers than is commonly assumed to be the case when markets are efficient in the traditional sense: in 
our terminology, RPE may fail even when FPE holds.  In addition, they show that the extent to which 
prices reveal information about an underlying state variable depends critically on the uses to which the 
information will be put by decision makers.  When using the information in the price, decision makers 
might harm the informativeness of the price about the variable they wish to learn.   
While the above discussion focuses on the effect of financial markets on production efficiency, a distinct 
welfare effect of financial markets relates to the possibility of sharing consumption risk.  Under some 
circumstances, increases in RPE lead to a reduction in risk-sharing possibilities, due to what has been 
dubbed the Hirshleifer (1971) effect: one cannot insure against shocks after their realization has become 
public.  Dow and Rahi (2003) develop a full welfare analysis of the effect of informed trading, 
considering both production and consumption effects. 
III.  Improved incentives 
A second channel through which financial markets may have real effects is by affecting a decision 
maker’s incentives to take real decisions.  This effect was first discussed by Baumol (1965) and an early 
formalization can be found in Fishman and Hagerty (1989).  In their paper, a manager chooses the firm’s 13 
 
investment level, which is unobservable to investors.  By assumption, the manager’s aim is to maximize 
the firm’s share price.  If the share price perfectly reflected expected cash flows, the manager would 
choose the efficient investment level, i.e., equate the marginal benefit of investment to its marginal cost.  
However, since the investment choice is unobservable to market participants, prices do not reflect 
expected cash flows: an investment that raises expected cash flows by $1 augments the expected share 
price by less than $1.  Consequently, the manager underinvests.  If price efficiency increases, the price 
more closely reflects the fundamental value of the firm and thus the benefits of any investment that the 
manager has undertaken.  This reduces the underinvestment problem and increases real efficiency.   
Fishman and Hagerty use this insight to examine a firm’s incentives to disclose information, and thereby 
affect price efficiency.   
In the incentives channel, decision makers such as the manager do not learn from prices.  Instead, prices 
affect the manager’s incentives as his contract is tied to them.  Thus, in our definition of RPE, the 
information that the price must reflect for the manager to take value-maximizing actions is information 
about his actions.  Put differently, the greater the extent to which the stock price reflects the manager’s 
actions, the greater his incentives to take desirable actions and avoid undesirable ones.  Thus, the role 
played by RPE in the two channels is subtly different.  In the incentives channel, RPE affects the decision 
maker’s incentives to take the efficient action.  In the learning channel, RPE affects his ability to take the 
efficient action, by revealing to him what the efficient action is.  As in Section II, RPE and FPE here need 
not coincide.  Paul (1992) theoretically demonstrates that efficient markets (i.e., markets that exhibit FPE) 
weight information according to the informativeness about asset value, while for optimal incentives, 
information should be weighted according to its informativeness about the manager’s actions.  The fact 
that FPE and RPE diverge is illustrated by Singh and Yerramilli (2010), who show that certain types of 
transparency simultaneously increase FPE but decrease RPE.   
A limiting case of Paul (1992) is that speculators have no information about the manager’s actions. Stein 
(1989) analyzes a model of this type, and shows that even when financial markets are efficient in the 14 
 
traditional (FPE) sense, managers who seek to maximize the stock price have the incentive to take non-
value-maximizing actions – in his model, earnings manipulation – that are not observed by the market.  
Again, the real inefficiency reflects a failure of RPE.  In the same vein, Brandenburger and Polak (1996) 
show that managers who seek to maximize the stock price have the incentive to ignore their own 
(superior) information about the best decision, and follow the market priors, again leading to non-value-
maximizing actions.  Aghion and Stein (2008) make a related point, showing that managers will choose to 
pursue the strategy expected by the market. 
The above papers generally take as exogenous the dependence of the manager’s contract on the stock 
price.  Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) endogenize this dependence by solving for the optimal contract 
between shareholders and the manager.  In such a case, changes in stock market efficiency have a second 
effect, in that they affect the equilibrium contract, and thus the extent to which the manager cares about 
the price.  In Holmstrom and Tirole, when price efficiency increases, the stock price provides a less noisy 
signal of firm value.  Thus, if the manager is risk averse, it is optimal to increase the weighting of the 
contract on the stock price relative to non-price measures of performance, such as accounting profits.  
Simply put, shareholders pay the manager according to the stock price since it reflects firm value.  Hence, 
it is effectively shareholders (the “principal”) rather than the manager (the “agent”) who learn from stock 
prices.  This endogenous response of the contract amplifies the effect of price efficiency on real efficiency 
in their model.  Separately, there are a number of other potentially important reasons why the manager 
may care about the stock price, which is essential for the incentives channel to operate.  For example, 
shareholders may have short horizons themselves, and hence want to incentivize the manager with 
contracts that depend on the short-term share price.  Alternatively, the manager may care about the short-
term share price due to takeover threats, reputational considerations, or expecting to sell his own shares in 
the short-run.   
In all the papers mentioned above, the decision maker is the manager of a firm.  In common with the 
learning channel discussed in Section II, stock-market efficiency may also affect the actions of other 15 
 
decision makers.  For example, Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) show that an increase in RPE raises the 
incentives of a blockholder to take a value-augmenting action, the benefits of which may not materialize 
until after a liquidity shock forces the blockholder to sell.   
IV.  Implications for financial markets and corporate finance 
Considering a feedback effect from financial markets to firms’ real decisions generates an array of 
implications for the study of financial markets and corporate finance.  Often, phenomena that are believed 
to be puzzling can be rationalized in a model in which financial markets have real effects.  We will 
frequently draw a distinction with the “traditional” view of security prices, in which cash flows affect 
prices, but prices have no effect on cash flows.  Our focus here is on models that exhibit endogenous 
feedback, i.e., via learning and/or incentives.  Several papers in the literature generate related implications 
based on models with exogenous feedback, i.e., where firm value or the firm’s investment decision is 
assumed to be mechanically tied to the price; see: Khanna and Sonti (2004) and Ozdenoren and Yuan 
(2008).   
IV.A Manipulative short-selling 
Regulators and firm managers are often concerned about manipulative short-selling in financial markets, 
whereby speculators drive down the price of a stock by short selling.  Such concerns have led to 
restrictions on short selling activities in different countries and at different points in time.  These 
concerns, however, are difficult to rationalize in a traditional model of financial markets.  First, in such a 
model, the stock price has no real effect, so there is no reason to be concerned about artificially low stock 
prices.  Second, it is often hard to generate manipulation as an equilibrium phenomenon, since price 
impact will cause a manipulator to sell at a low price and buy at a high price and hence lose money 
overall (Jarrow (1992)). 16 
 
Goldstein and Guembel (2008) consider a model where the manager of the firm learns from the stock 
price about the profitability of an investment project.  Due to this feedback effect, manipulation arises as 
an equilibrium phenomenon.  A speculator realizes that if she drives the stock price down, even when she 
has no information, the manager might cancel the investment since he thinks that the price decrease may 
have been due to negative information.  Since the cancelation is based on no actual information, it reduces 
firm value, allowing the speculator to profit from her short position.  Interestingly, the effect cannot work 
in the opposite direction.  If the speculator buys without information, she causes overinvestment, which is 
also bad for firm value, and so she loses from her long position. 
Related to the distinction made earlier between RPE and FPE, this paper also shows that the feedback 
effect can hamper the ability of decision makers to learn from the price about their optimal decision.  
Here, the feedback effect generates the manipulative motive that makes it hard to infer the profitability of 
the investment from the price.  Khanna and Mathews (2011) allow a large blockholder to counter the 
manipulators’ strategies, and identify more precisely when such manipulative strategies are likely to 
succeed. 
IV.B Limits to arbitrage 
In standard trading models in which firm value is exogenous, speculators can make profits by trading on 
their information.  Existing papers have identified limits to such arbitrage activities, typically based on 
exogenous forces such as trading restrictions or agency problems between the speculator and her own 
investors.  Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2011b) show that the informational role of prices generates a 
limit to arbitrage that arises endogenously as part of the trading process.  Consider a speculator who has 
negative information about firm prospects.  If she short-sells, this lowers the stock price.  The manager 
will observe the reduced stock price and infer that firm prospects are poor.  Consistent with the models in 
Section II, this may lead him to take a corrective action, such as reducing investment.  Downsizing the 
firm in response to poor firm conditions is efficient and improves the firm’s fundamental value, reducing 17 
 
the profitability of the speculator’s short position.  Thus, the speculator may refrain from short-selling in 
the first place.   
Interestingly, this feedback-driven limit to arbitrage is asymmetric: it deters informed selling, but 
encourages informed buying.  Trading on information in either direction increases price informativeness 
and thus firm value, through guiding the manager’s action.  This reduces the profitability of a short 
position, but increases the profitability of a long position.  This asymmetry originates from a similar force 
to the one present in Goldstein and Guembel (2008): in the presence of feedback, a speculator who short-
sells benefits from hurting the firm, but loses from helping it.  However, while Goldstein and Guembel 
(2008) highlight that the feedback effect can lead an uninformed speculator to short-sell, Edmans, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2011b) highlight that it may deter an informed speculator from short-selling.   
IV.C The survival of irrational traders 
An important question in asset pricing is whether irrational traders can survive in the long run.  Under the 
traditional view, irrational traders, who trade based on considerations unrelated to firms’ fundamentals, 
will lose money, and hence disappear from the market over time.  Hence, markets will be populated only 
by rational traders, and so prices will be efficient, correctly reflecting firms’ fundamentals.  However, as 
pointed out by Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (2006), when prices affect firms’ cash flows, this 
traditional view no longer holds.  Irrational traders can end up making a profit because their trades on 
non-fundamental considerations end up affecting firms’ cash flows in a way that allows them to make a 
profit on their trades.  
  IV.D Runs in the financial market 
Another type of market behavior that is puzzling under the traditional view is a self-reinforcing “run” on a 
stock, where many investors seek to sell a stock because other investors are also selling.  While many 
commentators believe that such runs are commonplace, they are hard to explain in traditional models.  18 
 
The reason is that self-reinforcing selling can occur only if selling exhibits strategic complementarity (i.e., 
the gain is larger when more people sell).  However, traditional forces in financial markets generate 
strategic substitutability: due to the price mechanism, when speculators sell, the price goes down, 
increasing the incentive for other speculators to buy, rather than sell.  Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan 
(2011b), building on Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2011a), show that strategic complementarities 
arise if capital providers base their decision on how much capital to provide to the firm on its stock price.  
The reason is that if many other speculators sell, the fall in the share price leads to a reduction in 
financing, and hence to a fall in firm value.  This can create ‘trading frenzies’ that resemble ‘run’ 
phenomena.   
IV.E Information-based  trade 
A long-standing puzzle in financial economics is the apparent existence of trade for purely informational 
reasons.  When cash flows are exogenous, no-trade theorems (see Milgrom and Stokey (1982)) imply that 
such trade is impossible, and so the only way to generate trade is to assume that some people trade for 
non-informational reasons (e.g., “noise traders” are present).  However, Bond and Eraslan (2010) show 
that trade based purely on informational differences can arise when decision makers observe the terms of 
trade (such as volume or price), and use the information revealed to make real decisions that affect the 
cash flows of the asset being traded. 
  IV.F  Governance through financial markets and the value of blockholders 
The traditional view of blockholders is that they exert governance through direct intervention in a firm’s 
operations, otherwise known as “voice”.  However, particularly in the U.S., blockholders appear to be too 
small to intervene effectively: while Holderness (2009) finds that 96% of U.S.  firms have at least one 
blockholder with a stake exceeding 5%, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) document that 
only 20% (10%) of large (medium) U.S.  firms contain a blockholder who owns at least 20%, which they 
argue is the threshold required to exert control.  The governance role of such blockholders, and thus the 19 
 
rationale for their existence, appears puzzling in the light of existing intervention theories.  However, the 
incentives channel studied in Section III shows that blockholders can exert governance even in the 
absence of control rights.  By gathering and trading on private information - known as governance 
through trading or “exit”
8 – they increase price informativeness and thus the manager’s incentives to take 
actions that improve firm value.   
A central question is why blockholders have a special role in such informed trading compared to other 
investors.  Edmans (2009) analyzes the link between block size, information acquisition incentives, and 
informed trading. In the presence of short-sales constraints, a trader with a zero position has little 
incentive to acquire information, because if she receives a negative signal, she cannot trade on it. Up to a 
point, the larger one’s stake, the more one can sell upon a negative signal, and thus the greater the 
incentives to gather the signal to begin with. However, if the block becomes too large, liquidity becomes a 
constraint and so the blockholder cannot sell her entire stake upon a negative signal. Thus, the optimal 
block size is finite. 
The particular managerial agency problem examined by Edmans (2009) is that managers may behave 
myopically, and in this context he shows how blockholders, by increasing price efficiency, can help 
augment long-term investment.  In a contemporaneous paper, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) study a 
different specification of the firm’s agency problem, and show that, while the blockholder alleviates the 
agency problem of the manager taking a “bad” action (e.g.  shirking), she can sometimes make it more 
difficult to motivate the manager to take a “good” action (e.g.  exerting effort). 
Goldman and Strobl (2011) study a different aspect of blockholder behavior.  When blockholders’ time-
horizons are shorter than project horizons, they have the incentive to try to manipulate short-term share 
prices upwards.  A manager who is himself compensated on the basis of short-term share prices then 
responds by extending the time horizon of the project.  Consequently, the combination of short horizons 
                                                            
8 The survey of McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2011) shows that exit is the leading governance mechanism used by 
institutions.   20 
 
for both blockholders and managers can, counterintuitively, end up inducing managers to extend project 
time horizons. 
Viewing governance as occurring through financial markets, rather than the exercise of control, in turn 
has new implications for the optimal blockholder structure.  In voice theories, a single large blockholder 
is optimal, as she has strong incentives to engage in costly intervention; breaking up the block into 
multiple units weakens voice due to the free-rider problem.  However, if governance occurs through exit, 
Edmans and Manso (2011) show that multiple small blockholders can be optimal.  The same free-rider 
problems that hinder voice actually enhance exit: since multiple blockholders cannot co-ordinate to limit 
their orders and maximize combined trading profits, they trade competitively, impounding more 
information into prices.  The optimal number of blockholders is thus a trade-off between the positive 
effect on “exit” and the negative effect on “voice.”  
Blockholder models also make precise a potential cost of price efficiency.  Maug (1998) studies a 
blockholder who is considering a value-adding intervention.  Due to the free-rider problem, her stake in 
the firm may be insufficient to induce her to bear the costs of intervention.  However, she can profit from 
intervention through a second source: the ability to buy additional shares at a price that does not fully 
reflect the benefits of her intervention.  Consequently, lower  price efficiency facilitates blockholder 
intervention, raising real efficiency.  In a similar vein, Kyle and Vila (1991) and Kahn and Winton (1998) 
show that when the price impact of trades is lower – often associated with low price efficiency – there is 
more blockholder formation in the first place.  This in turn improves real efficiency as the blockholder 
subsequently engages in intervention. 
  IV.G  Optimal disclosure policy 
A key topic in accounting and finance is the extent to which firms should disclose their private 
information to the market.  The decision about disclosure changes fundamentally when there is potential 
for two-way learning, i.e., the market can learn from the firm and the firm can learn from the market.  21 
 
Bond and Goldstein (2011) show that a benefit of disclosure is that it reduces the uncertainty that traders 
are exposed to, encouraging them to trade more aggressively on their information, and so enables the firm 
to learn from the market more effectively.  On the other hand, when the information available to the firm 
is correlated with the information available to traders, disclosure reduces speculators’ informational 
advantage and so they trade less aggressively, reducing the ability of the firm to learn.  Overall, disclosure 
is beneficial when it involves dimensions of information that speculators do not have access to, but may 
be harmful otherwise.  Gao and Liyang (2011) study a different tradeoff, whereby the disclosure of 
information by the firm is beneficial because it reduces the adverse selection in the financial market, but 
costly since it discourages speculators from producing their own information, and so the firm learns less.  
Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan (2010) study a third tradeoff, based on the idea that the disclosure of 
information by the firm is the trigger for feedback from the market.  The benefit in disclosing is then the 
ability to gain feedback from the market, while the cost is that it makes the manager appear uninformed 
(as he is seeking feedback).  In the paper by Fishman and Hagerty (1989), which we reviewed earlier, 
disclosure enhances the efficiency of the firm’s investment, and is thus desirable for the firm.  However, 
due to externalities among firms, they end up disclosing too much in equilibrium. 
 IV.H  Security  design 
Considering the effect of market information on real investment decisions can have important 
implications for the firm’s choice of capital structure.  In a model of primary markets, Fulghieri and 
Lukin (2001) challenge the conclusion of the pecking-order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984), 
according to which firms will issue debt rather than equity, because the former is less information-
sensitive and thus subject to fewer adverse selection costs.  Fulghieri and Lukin note that because equity 
is more information-sensitive, its issuance encourages speculators to acquire more information.  This in 
turn reduces information asymmetry between the market and the firm, rendering equity sometimes 
preferable.   22 
 
Chang and Yu (2010) study a related problem in a model of secondary markets.  Informed speculators 
create a benefit because the firm can learn from their information when making an investment decision.  
However, this comes with a cost, due to the adverse selection between informed speculators and 
uninformed investors, which increases the firm’s cost of capital.  As a result, the firm will design its 
capital structure to increase information production when it can benefit more from market information.  
The firm does this by increasing leverage, which makes equity more information-sensitive and enables 
informed speculators to profit more when they trade equity.  Hennessey (2009) studies a similar tradeoff, 
but endogenizes noise trading.  This leads to different implications for the optimal capital structure.  
Informed traders can no longer profit by trading on the most information-sensitive security since noise 
traders will refrain from trading it.  Hence, the way to generate market information is to create a debt 
security that is risky enough to enable speculators to make a profit, but not too risky so that noise traders 
still trade in it. 
V.  Empirical evidence 
We now turn to empirical evidence of the real effects of secondary financial markets.  Identifying this real 
effect is a challenging task.  It is obviously not sufficient to regress investment (or other real variables) on 
stock prices and controls, for at least two reasons.  First, a positive relation between stock prices and 
investment does not imply causality from the former to the latter: it could arise from an omitted variable 
that affects both, or reverse causality.  Second, even assuming a causal explanation, it may result from 
mechanisms other than the learning or incentives channels, such as a primary markets explanation.   
One approach in the literature is to conduct cross-sectional analyses showing that the real effect is greater 
in exactly those firms where theory would predict that the learning or incentive channels are likely to be 
stronger.  This can shed light on the mechanism behind the feedback effect, and also address endogeneity 
concerns.  For example, showing that the correlation between prices and real decisions is stronger when 23 
 
the price contains information not available to managers suggests that causality is likely to go from prices 
to real decisions. 
An important case in which decision makers may learn from prices is in the evaluation of merger 
opportunities, as discussed in the introduction.  If a manager encounters a negative market reaction after 
announcing an acquisition, he will likely realize that there is a collective view that the acquisition is 
value-destroying, and may cancel it.  In an early paper, Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) do not find evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis.  In a more recent paper, Luo (2005) uses new test specifications closer to 
the underlying theory, combined with a much larger sample, and finds support for this hypothesis.  He 
shows that in those cases where learning is most likely, i.e., when the deal is irreversible and when the 
market most plausibly has information that the manager does not, the probability of cancellation is much 
higher after a low announcement return.  Kau, Linck and Rubin (2008) extend his analysis and show that 
such learning is more likely when governance mechanisms are in place to reduce the agency problem 
between the manager and the shareholders.   
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) study all investments.  They show that the sensitivity of investment to 
price (or Tobin’s Q) is stronger when there is more private information injected into the price in the 
trading process (based on market microstructure measures).  This information is not related to proxies of 
managerial information, and so their result suggests that managers glean new information from the price 
and use it in their investment decisions.  Bakke and Whited (2010) demonstrate that the effect of price 
informativeness on the sensitivity of investment to Q continues to hold when correcting for measurement 
error in Q.  However, the relation between the sensitivity of investment to price and a measure of capital 
constraints, which was documented earlier by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), ceases to hold when this 
correction is in place.  Foucault and Fresard (2011) show that the sensitivity of investment to price is 
higher for firms that trade in two markets, especially if they can glean more new information from prices.  24 
 
Relatedly, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) show that price informativeness is positively related to the 
efficiency of real investment, which is consistent with both the learning and incentives channels.
9 
Kang and Liu (2008) directly examine the incentives channel.  Consistent with theory, they show that the 
extent to which CEO compensation is based on market prices is positively related to measures of price 
informativeness.  Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) posit that, if price informativeness increases 
managerial incentives, there is less need for other disciplinary mechanisms such as board monitoring.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, they find a negative relation between price informativeness and board 
independence.  With regard to the incentives of other decision makers such as blockholders, Norli, 
Ostergaard, and Schindele (2010) show that liquidity increases the likelihood of contested proxy 
solicitations and shareholder proposals, consistent with Maug’s (1998) predictions.   
To further address causality concerns, a number of recent papers have used exogenous shocks to market 
liquidity (a driver of price efficiency) to analyze the real effect of financial markets.  Fang, Noe, and Tice 
(2009) demonstrate a causal effect of liquidity on firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) using the natural 
experiment of decimalization: in 2001, the U.S.  stock exchanges moved from tick sizes of 1/16 to one 
cent, leading to an exogenous increase in liquidity.  They find a positive effect, consistent with both the 
learning and incentive channels.  This effect of liquidity on firm value is particularly strong for firms with 
high managerial incentives, consistent with the incentive channel in particular.  Bharath, Jayaraman, and 
Nagar (2011) show that positive shocks to liquidity (e.g., decimalization) improve firm value, particularly 
for firms with larger block ownership.  As predicted by the incentives channel, the impact of liquidity 
shocks on the blockholder-firm value association is increasing in managerial incentives.   
While Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) and Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2011) study the impact of 
financial markets on firm value in general, other papers investigate the effect of financial markets on 
                                                            
9 Another approach is to compare the investment behavior of public and private firms.  However, it is difficult to use 
this approach to distinguish between different channels.  Examples of such papers include Mortal and Reisel (2011) 
and Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011). 25 
 
specific channels through which financial markets can increase firm value.  Jayaraman and Milbourn 
(2011) demonstrate that CEO incentives are increasing in liquidity, using stock splits as an instrument for 
liquidity.  Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2011) show that liquidity increases the likelihood of a hedge fund 
acquiring a block in a firm to begin with.  Conditional upon acquiring a block, liquidity induces the 
blockholder to choose governance through exit rather than voice.  They use decimalization to document 
causal effects, and both of these effects are stronger for firms with higher managerial incentives.  Kim and 
Kang (2011) use decimalization to show that liquidity leads to a less negative relationship between R&D 
and the probability of CEO firing, consistent with the hypothesis that liquidity causes the benefits of R&D 
to be more closely incorporated into stock prices.     
The previous papers study the real effects of a shock to liquidity, which affects the efficiency of prices.  
As discussed in Sections II and III, price efficiency matters for both the learning and incentive channels.  
Another approach is to identify a shock to the level of prices, which is related to the learning channel in 
particular.
10  This is the approach of Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2011a), who study the impact of a 
firm’s market price on the likelihood that it will receive a takeover bid.  While it is commonly believed 
that firms, which trade at a discount to fundamental value, attract acquirers, it is difficult to detect this 
relation in the data, since stock prices are endogenous and incorporate the anticipation of future takeovers.  
Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang address this issue and identify a negative causal effect of prices on takeover 
activity, using mutual fund redemptions caused by investor withdrawals to identify an exogenous shock to 
market prices.  This effect could arise from a learning channel if target shareholders learn the value of 
their firm from the stock price and are willing to sell their shares at a price that is close to that – thus, the 
market price is not a sideshow but affects the price that they are prepared to accept in a takeover.  This 
assumes that they are unable to disentangle a stock price decline caused by mutual fund redemptions from 
one that is driven by information. 
                                                            
10 Under the learning channel, the level of prices reveals information about an underlying state and drives a real 
decision; by contrast, in the incentives channel, it is only the informativeness of prices rather than their level that is 
relevant.   26 
 
Finally, while all the papers mentioned above test the extent to which markets affect real economic 
activity, an important avenue for future empirical research to explore is how feedback from prices to cash 
flows affects the price formation process.  The papers reviewed in Sections II, III, and IV make numerous 
theoretical predictions.  In a recent paper, Davis, Korenok, and Prescott (2011) provide a first step in this 
direction by performing a lab experiment to test the predictions of Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) 
and Sundaresan and Wang (2011).  They find results broadly consistent with the theory. 
Before concluding this section, it is worth revisiting the well-known study of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990, “MSV”).  MSV investigate whether stock returns (CAPM alphas) predict investment, at both an 
individual firm level and at the aggregate level.
11  Consistent with the learning channel laid out above (the 
”active informant,” in MSV’s terminology), MSV find that stock returns are a positively significant 
predictor of investment in all specifications, both economically and statistically, and that this significance 
is robust to the addition of firm fundamentals (cash flow and sales) as controls.  However, the increment 
in R
2 that results from adding stock returns, when the investment regression already contains firm 
fundamentals, is low.  Thus, the authors conclude that the economic significance of the market is limited 
and that it is somewhat of a “sideshow”.   
The published discussions by Matthew Shapiro and James Poterba, included at the end of the article, 
highlight potential issues with the empirical results presented in MSV; and using a different methodology, 
Barro (1990) finds that stock market changes have a strong effect on investment.  Moreover, even taking 
MSV’s results at face value, it is not clear that they imply that the market is a sideshow, for three main 
reasons.  First, the results have no implications for the incentives channel discussed in Section III.  Under 
this channel, the level of investment is increasing in the informativeness, rather than level, of stock prices.  
Second, MSV’s empirical design cannot detect important examples of the learning channel.  For example, 
                                                            
11 MSV also study the effect of stock returns on financing (debt and equity issuance).  This is the primary-markets 
channel that is outside the scope of this survey.  The results are similar to the investment regressions in MSV.  For 
other papers that study the real effect of financial markets through the primary markets channels, see Baker, Stein, 
and Wurgler (2003), Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005), Derrien and Kecskes (2011), and Grullon, 
Michenaud, and Weston (2011). 27 
 
if a firm announces a takeover, its stock price subsequently falls, and then the manager cancels the 
takeover leading to a stock price recovery, the MSV approach would find no abnormal return and no 
change in investment.  Third, MSV’s preferred R
2 measure does not capture the possibility that when 
firms do learn from the prices, the improvement in efficiency is very large.  Instead, the relatively small 
change in R
2 merely shows that, most of the time firms do not respond to abnormal stock returns over and 
above their response to changes in fundamentals.  However, it is possible that the times firms do respond 
to price changes are particularly important – for example, if they cut investment when the return will be 
disastrously low.  By analogy, most of the time an airline pilot may learn nothing from his instrument 
panel over and above what he can see with his eyes.  Thus, in a regression analysis of pilot actions, the 
increment in R
2 of including instrument readings in addition to visual evidence would be small.   
However, if the instrument panel occasionally enables the pilot to avoid a crash, it is very far from being a 
“sideshow.”  Consistent with the idea that stock price changes have a large effect, MSV’s results imply 
that a one standard-deviation change in 3-year alphas is associated with 31% higher investment growth, 
even after controlling for their measures of firm fundamentals, which is economically significant 
compared to the mean (median) 3-year investment growth of 48% (10%) (see table 1 and regression 2.3).   
VI.  Conclusion 
Over the last twenty years, a sizeable literature has emerged to analyze the ways in which secondary 
financial markets affect the real economy.  The literature is both theoretical and empirical, and lies at the 
intersection of corporate finance, asset pricing, and market microstructure.  In this article we have sought 
to synthesize some of the main themes and insights of the literature; although we have made every effort 
to widely survey the literature, it is also inevitable that our synthesis reflects our own research on the 
topic. 
Overall, we make two main points.  First, precisely because the question of the real effects of financial 
markets combines aspects of various sub-specialties in finance, it is necessary to augment the traditional 28 
 
notion of price efficiency – what we have termed here as forecasting price efficiency – to take into 
account whether prices reveal the information necessary for real efficiency; in our terminology, does 
revelatory price efficiency hold?  Second, taking seriously the real effect of financial markets helps shed 
light on a range of phenomena that otherwise appear puzzling.  Again, this is a consequence of combining 
insights from various fields: block-holding patterns, traditionally a corporate finance topic, make more 
sense once asset pricing considerations are added; and trading frenzies, traditionally an asset pricing topic, 
make more sense once corporate finance considerations are added. 
We began the survey by drawing a distinction between research on the real effects of primary versus 
secondary financial markets.  Looking ahead to future research, there is potential gain from combining the 
two approaches.  First, the channels of amplification studied by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in the context of primary financial markets are developed in models where the 
need for collateral constrains borrowing but with symmetric information about collateral value, whereas 
the models of secondary financial markets that we reviewed here build on asymmetric information.   
Introducing asymmetric information into models of primary financial markets may enrich these models 
and potentially strengthen the quantitative effects that they generate.  Second, primary financial markets 
and secondary financial markets are sometimes blended in real-world situations, creating room for models 
that combine the two approaches.  For example, consider financial institutions that hold stocks of firms 
traded in the secondary market and use them as collateral when borrowing from other financial 
institutions.  Here, trading in secondary markets and the collateral channel in primary markets work 
together to generate the overall effect of financial markets on the real economy. 
Another direction for future research is to combine the feedback effect reviewed in this article into 
traditional asset pricing models to explain patterns in stock returns.  In a contemporaneous survey, Kogan 
and Papanikolaou (2012) review a literature that attempts to explain patterns in stock returns based on 
firm behavior.  This literature, however, is based on a world of symmetric information where the 29 
 
secondary financial market is essentially a side show that has no effect on the firm.  We believe it will be 
interesting to introduce the feedback effect reviewed here into these models. 
Finally, the literature reviewed in this article is still in its early stages.  There is substantial scope for 
further research to advance our understanding of the implications of the feedback loop between financial 
markets and the real economy, whereby financial markets affect and reflect the events in the real 
economy.  As we argued in this article, this has implications for regulation of banks and firms, for 
managerial behavior and corporate governance, and for many other aspects of financial economics.  We 
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